
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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


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E 8577

Room 2 5 5th Reptember, 1947.

-IGSONCI-

Mr. Gore-Booth, Mr. Hankey, Mr. Ivlay, Mr. Loure ales Appleby, Mr. Alkinson (2.2.), and sir a. Auckor and ar. Fow (I.a.C.).

The meeting, which was informal, beard a comprehensive report from hir arthur Rucker dealing with a number of refugee problems.


pression. dir arthur said that when 1. he arrived at denova there was considerable choos owing to the headquarters being divided between Geneve, Faris and London and also to the normal difficulties attendent upon the fusion of two organisations like I.G.C.E. and S.A.M. However, the amoinistrative machine was now tlay and although he considered that overhead expenses were still too high they were being out down. Having created order at the centre, he and al. Tuck were starting on the field organisation and had already visited italy and the U.J. one of Semany.

2. <u>(perstions.</u> It is juite clear that under present conditions, I.... will not be able to liguidate the refugee problem for many years, and there is no liadlhood of any reductions in next year's budget. There are about 11 militon refugees, of whom 7-800,000 are in assembly contros. - Unit about 30,000 are likely to be resettled or reputristed by the end of this year and this loss is likely to be offeet by I.S. .. having to take on new arrivals from astern surope. The high costs of care and maintenance left little svallable for resettlement and the winges problem might well become self-perpetuating.

If this state of affairs wore to be ended, two decisions would have to be made:-

- (a) a time limit should be fixed after which no new cases would be accepted Dy 1.
- (b) countries should be eaked to take a quote of perugees on a non-selective basis, including o responsble proportion of aged, infim and Jewish refusees (the last nemed forming some 25 per cent of the total).

There was no longer a serious shortage of shipping, and provided that proposal (b) were accepted by sufficient countries, there was every reason to hope that the refugee problem would be disposed of in 18 months. Freeent resettlement schemes were far too slow and provided no real solution, since not only was the selection process slow and laborious but it was also unfair to many of the most deserving categories of parageos. Furthermore, existing resetclement schemes were not reducing the





ere of sick, aged and Jewish refugees.

He and Mr. Tuck had come to the conclusion that only by adopting the above proposals could the members of the Freparatory Commission hope to avoid being saddled with a recurring expenditure on care and maintenance which would perpetuate the refugee problem. They proposed to put this to the Freparatory Commission and were now even contemplating the possibility of raising it at Lake Success. He hoped that H.M.Government would start considering their attitude **instit num** to these proposals now.

3. <u>Personnel.</u> Sir Arthur Mucker thought it most unwise to institute "heresy hunts" against individual employees of F.C.I.R.C. on political grounds. - However, any person who tried to sabotage I.R.C. policy or who allowed subjective considerations to affect this work adversely would be got rid of.


There was no truth whatever in reports of friction between himself and Mr. Tuck. On the contrary he could not wish to work with anybody better. There was little point in our pressing for people to be given jobs by I.M.O. which was slready overweighted with British and U.S. personnel, but he had no objection to enquiries being passed to him.


4. British Zone of Germany. Sir Arthur said that he felt a certain uncasiness at reports that the head of f.S.D.P. Directorate was blassed against international organisations such as I.R.C. Mr. Ivimy said that although there had been a feeling here that such might be the case, he had been assured that this was not so. However, we should not allow any friction to develop and would, if necessary, take firm steps to deal with any member of the Control Commission staff who adopted an unco-operative attitude.

5. <u>Italy.</u> The situation there was not entirely satisfactory as there appeared to be a hangover from U.N.A.A. days of extravagance and waste. The Italian operations were very expensive and P.C.I.A.O. would have to take strong measures to deal with this.

With the ratification of the Peace Treaty, refugees in Italy were only protected by the good will of the Italians. bile 2.C.I.M. could extend a certain measure of protection to "whites", they could do nothing for "greys" and hoped that H.M. Government would follow the example of the U.S. authorities and transfer their share of these incligibles to Germany, whence he was sure the bulk obuild be easily resettled in due course. He was informed that we were asking Berlin whether this could be done. In response to a further enquiry as to whether H.m.G. thought that r.C.I.R.w. could do anything more to help, the 100-150,000 refugees at large in Italy, he was assured that we considered that they had done everything they could for these people.







The second second second second

On the question of the Italo-I.M.O. Agreement he said that although the Italians (with U.S. support) had opposed making any financial contribution, Count Sforse had finally concented to make svailable various goods and services for A.C.I.M.O's Italian Operations. A Joint Committee had been set up and the statesphere was much better.

6. <u>Budget</u>. The present estimated budget of 122 million dollars was provisionally allocated as follows:-

> Administration 19 million, Care and Maintenance 34 million, Repatriation 8 million, Remettlement 9 million, Reserve 2 million.


This was an impossible buiget to work on, since the allocation for resottlement was negligible in comparison with the vest expenditure on cars and maintenance. However, it was the best that could be obtained under existing conditions.

There was no doubt whatever that 10 T. comps, particularly in Italy, were being used as staging posts on the way to valestine. Nowever, there was little that i..... could do to stop this state or stialrs. They had already laid it down that except in cases of acute hardship, no newcomers were to be admitted into comps. Novever, the conditions under which many "infiltress" were living wore so bad that sheer humanity compelled them to accept a certain number of the most deserving cases, who were, of course, cligible for 2.m.... ald under the terms of the Constitution. Matters were made worse by the fact that Jewa ma who had left camps on the last lap of their journey to releating had started flocking back after the news of the return of the "resident gerfield" Jews.

In his view, there would be no stopping this traffic unless other countries were prepared to admit Jews. At present, nobody wanted Jewish limit rants - a fact that plays into the hends of the organisers of this traffic.

8. <u>France</u>. The French Government had egreed to accept a minimum of 50,000 displaced persons including dependents. They were being pressed to take more, but there were internal difficulties using to the large number of spanish Republican and other refugees already in France.

9. <u>Nord Levels.</u> The treparatory Commission had fixed 1900 calories as the food level for displaced persons, and it was hoped that a certain levelling-up would be possible in the British Lone of Germany in order that displaced persons in different areas would receive approximately equal rations. Steps were being taken to replace the more expensive American foods by cheaper variaties. As far as the British Lone was concerned any increased (expenditure



expenditure on rations for displaced persons would be recoverable from I.R.C.

Mr. Iviny promised favourable consideration for this proposal, while at the same time caphasizing the difficulties inherent in giving displaced persons rations at a higher calorie level than that received by the German population.


10. Displaced versons in the United Kingdom.

P.C.I.R.C. were envious to enter into an agreement with H.M.G. regarding the protection of the interests of refugees coming to this country, similar to Agreements concluded with other governments. This would provide for their being joined by their families in due course and for their eventual eligibility for naturalisation.

Sir Arthur expressed the view that although H.E.G's record in admitting refugees to this country was an excellent one, there was still room for improvement. Not only was "Restward Ho" failing to absorb refugees rapidly enough but it was also actually hindering resettlement elsewhere, since families would not accept resettlement overseas when one of their members was in the U.E. He felt certain that displaced persons could devise temporary accommodation for themselves and their families in this country without any undue diversion of British labour and materials from the present building programme.


If a deputation of displaced persons, led by an 1.A.C. official, were to be allowed to come here and inspect derelict camps, he was sure that they could make them habitable. The very worst accommodation here was preferable to the conditions under which they were living in dermany. He was sure that the J.K. authorities overrated the standard of accommodation required.

In the ensuing discussion on this point it was agreed that steps should be taken to increase the flow of displaced persons into this country particularly for agricultural work, and that families should be brought here as soon as possible. The principal obstacles were the lack of suitable accommodation, although it was felt that this might be overease provided that the local and national authorities concerned would refrain from insisting on high standards of accommodation. It was pointed out that even in the overcrowded assembly centres often with a complete absence of emenities, there had been no epidemics, and the standard of health was higher than that of the German population. II. the flow of displaced persons was increased, suitable publicity should be given so that would-be employers would not be kept in ignorance that displaced persons labour was available to replace repatriated prisoner-ofwar labour.



E 0456 13 OCT 1947 PALESTINE Jewish lefuque Problem. Registry E9456 8576 3 Number Adaches lion of Jewish displaced fersons V.N.R.R.A. assistance, alexplainis FROM F.O minute. receive - c M. Wilkinson its extent of the firstlen, reason's for No. Enispe, rike attilude Ò exordus of im 30 Sapr. Dated H.M.G. Received in Registry 13 OCV. Last Paper (Minutes.) 8576 In P.P. A.J. Minute, Whenis for top I References Brief for U.K. Del (Print) CJ. E. CABLE 14/10 (How disposed of) the been and N. York Δ Delig A uk Contamis Cove on dos and our it is me Good a ozs Beins ort. 15 Those that when we make our case in New (Action completed) (Index) York for the liquidation of the refuge problem, it will get full publicity. Defor copied to heads of Regional info. Det Juformation Tolieg Next Paper Tara News Delphan AND

This material was used in The Diplomatic Fogranne of Re LPG on 7 Revovenber, 1947 (20py attached) after direnseron. The with United Nations (Re. 300) Ospartment (due Wilkenicon). Amah of the information contained in it has also been gluien 15 the Diplomatic aleo spoken to Mr. Bore-Book on his ostim pour vers lande. I hops it may form the basis of a special article on "trader" at the appropriate mourent. The situation has been complicated of the Tures 's commissioning of two special articles on the repiger problem by high Bur fitzroup hackow, but they may be covered by a leader based rather ou this material. It may allo be possible 15 works in in parallel part of the illogal unnigration brief, Ospendnip on four metsuctions. Rowse (Premoves) 21/11



Sent-by Mr Wilkinson to Mr Beelay under Cover of a letter of Sept. 30th

(WR 3261/7/48)

The Jewish Refugee Problem

I. Extent of the Problem.

The attached list gives the number of Jewish displaced persons receiving U.N.R.R.A. assistance on the 30th June, 1947, as 154,996. To this figure must be added an unknown number of Jews who are not in receipt of international aid and some fresh arrivals from Rastern Europe. The total number of Jewish refugees is estimated at between 200,000 - 250,000. It is noticeable that, except for an infinitesimal fraction, all these Jews come from Eastern and Central Europe.

II. <u>Reasons for Exodus</u>.

On the face of it, now that Nazism has been destroyed, together with its anti-semistic Fascist offshoots there would seem to be no reason why Jews should not live in peace in their native lands, under Governments which are far more favourably disposed towards Jews than any of their predecessors.


One explanation that has been advanced is that Jews are unwilling to remain in a Europe which has been the graveyard of their people. If this were so one might have expected a corresponding exodus of Jews from Western Europe. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that non-Jews were also persecuted by the Mazis. Lidice and Orsdour-sur-Glaone were not Jewish villages. Yet there is no exodus of Czechs and Frenchmen.


It is equally certain that never in the history of Jewry have there been more European Governments sympathetic to Jewish interests than there are today, especially in Eastern Europe where anti-semitism used to be common in Governmental circles. Now, not only are the Eastern European Governments pro-Jewish, as befits those whose political beliefs spring from the doctrines of such eminent Jews as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, but also they include a considerable number of Jews - Poland particularly.

The real reasons for the Jewish exodus are probably as follows:-

- (1) The new social and economic set-up in Eastern Europe is not likely to be of any enduring benefit to the Jews of those countries, who are chiefly engaged in connercial activities which are likely to be curtailed as the economies of these states become more collectivised.
- (ii) Anti-semitism has increased among the population party through economic causes such as the restitution of Jewish property and the activities of Jewish speculators and black-market operators and party because anti-semitism is linked up with **pepular** opposition to the Governments whose known support for the Jews is very embarrassing to the latter.

The Slav Governments are not reluctant to let the Jews emigrate, although they do not extend the same privilege to their non-Jewish compatriots. It is noticeable that, although very vocal in demanding that their nationals be repatriated, the Slavs






have never sought to induce their Jewish nationals to return home and have in fact done their utmost to prevent them from doing so. Despite numerous appeals, the Roumanian Government. for example, has not allowed Roumanian Jews to return to Roumania from Palestine. The reasons for this attitude would appear to be:-

- The departure of the Jews means a decline in anti-Semitism (1)and removes a cause of anti-Government propaganda.
- (11) The Governments would gain kudos in certain quarters for helping to get rid of the Jews, who, for their part will be grateful for the privilege extended to them, but denied to non-Jews, of emigrating from a Slav State.
- (111) As most of the Jews are not engaged in productive work. their departure will mean a loss of consumers without a corresponding loss of producers.
- (iv) Once abroad, Jews, unlike other emigres, will not be centres of intrigue and propaganda against the Slav Powers, but will on the contrary be more favourably disposed towards them for letting them go than towards the Western Powers, especially Britain, for impeding their passage to other lands or for being unwilling to have them as immigrants.
- Jewish refugees will add to the already-existing refugee (v) burden on the German, Austrian and Italian economies. thus making recovery more difficult and paving the way for Communism.
- (vi) Not merely does this exodus make the Palestine problem more acute, with the prospect of trouble in the Middle Bast from which the Soviet alone can benefit, but it also causes friction between the United Kingdom and other Western Powers over illegal Jewish traffic.
- (vii) It makes the infiltration of Soviet agents much easier if they can be smuggled Westward among Jewish refugees.


Responsibility for the plight of Jewish refugees must be laid at the door of the governments of their countries of origin as well as of the Zionists themselves. It might be useful to bring this out in discussions on the problems not only, as a rejoiner to Slav attacks on us, but also to demonstrate the close connexion between Zionism and Communism - a move which may have a beneficial effect on certain delegations whose friendliness to the former creed may be outweighed by their dislike of the latter. It might also be pointed out that allegations of tyranny made against the Palestine Administration sound strange when uttered by representatives of countries from which thousands of Jews have fled, preferring to go to Palestine and even to remain in Germany, rather than return to their countries of origin.

Attitude of His Majesty's Government. IV

We do not consider that the Jewish refugee problem should be considered separately from the general refugee problem. More than three-quarters of the refugees in Europe are not Jews and any resettlement proposals which may be made by member-governments should not discriminate in any way between refugees on religious or racial grounds. There is, of course, the probability that many Jewish refugees will not be acceptable on industrial grounds, but this does not involve any departure from principle.



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


The General Assembly Resolution of the 12th February, 1946, stated that the refugee problem was "international in scope and nature". In our view, this means that all countries which subscribed to that Resolution are morally bound to play their part in finding a solution to this problem. They should therefore support the International Refugee Organisation and ensure that it receives the necessary funds to carry out its work. They should also provide a home in their own territories for as many refugees as possible, without any racial or religious discrimination. Any Government which is not prepared to do this has no right to advocate any alteration in the Falestine immigration laws in order that it may shirk its own responsibilitie at the expense of Falestine.

R

We can point with considerable pride at our own record in this matter. Sanctuary has been provided in the United Kingdom for over 300,000 persons who would otherwise have been in refugee camps. It is likely that a further 100,000 will be brought here under the Ministry of Labour and National Service's scheme for European Volunteer Workers. In other words, more than a quarter of all the refugees in Europe will have been given a chance to start a new life in this country. This is more than all the other United Nations combined have been able to do since the end of the war. If we can do this, despite our economic difficulties, there is no reason why other countries better fitted for man resettlement should not follow our example. The refugees themselves do not want words of sympathy from the General Assembly. They want to have a chance to make a fresh start in life, and this chance must be given them by members of the United Nations, who cannot avoid responsibility for the plight of these refugees unless they open their doors to them.

If the opportunity should arise, it might be proposed that all member-governments should say how many rerugees they would be prepared to admit and whether they wished to impose any racial or religious disqualifications on intending immigrants.



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
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
Control Committee

CC(47)101 5 August 1947

JEWISH DISPLACED PERSONS RECEIVING UNRRA ASSISTANCE IN GERMANY, AUSTRALIA, ITALY AND THE MIDDLE EAST AS OF 30 JUNE 1947

CLAIMED NATIONALITY	I TOTAL	Number of GERMANY	Jewish Disj AUSTRIA	placed Perso ITALY	ons MIDDLE EAST
1	2	3	4	5	6
TOTALS	<u>154,996</u>	134,864	<u>3,337</u>	16,779	16
Austrian Czechoslovak German Greek Hungarian Latvian Lithuanian Palestinian Polish Roumanian Turk ish U. S. S. R. Yugoslav Undetermined Other	538 6,888 5,792 226 8,280 281 1,821 88 121,213 7,455 29 1,303 565 266 251	329 5,904 5,651 144 6,868 241 1,616 55 107,308 4,939 10 1,190 267 221 121	0 145 5 9 189 6 6 19 2,648 288 0 0 18 1 3	207 839 136 70 1,223 34 199 14 11,255 2,228 19 113 277 40 125	2 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 4 2







1 3 OCT 1947

M' Beith Eastern Sept. 1956 operation/

MEMCRANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE REPUGEE PROBLEM

The extent of the problem in Germany and Austria is summarised in the attached tables. To the total of 995,000 contained therein should be added 30,000 persons in comps in Italy (more than half of whom are Jewish), approximately 150,000 outside comps in Italy and 30,000 (mostly Poles) in the Middle East and elsewhere.

2. Of this total of 1,005,000, the Volkadeutache and Reichadeutache are capable of absorption into the German or Austrian economies. However, they are in demand as emigrants, especially to France, and they are thus competing with nonassimilable displaced persons. Nevertheless, any move which reduces the displaced person population in Austria is to be welcomed, and we have not opposed this action on the part of the French Government. In any case, the removal of Yugoalav Volkadeutache from our Zone of Austria is politically important since it reduces the possibility of friction between Austria and Yugoalavia in the future.

3. Although there is still a trickle of persons returning home, repatriation is now obviously no longer likely to reduce the refugee problem to any degree. In fact, the numbers returning home are more than offset by new arrivols of Jews and Volksdautsche from Eastern Europe.

4. Resettlement has got under way this year, but is not proceeding rapidly enough. Western Europe has been by far the most fruitful area for resettlement, although, owing to housing difficulties and the densely-populated nature of countries such as Belgium and the United Kingdom, immigration has to be highly selective and the resettlement of families is often difficult. The most successful schemes are those in operation/


operation in this country and Belgium. We have already absorbed 26,000 persons, while Belgium is taking 20,000 workers from the United States Zone and 15,000 from our Zone of Germany together with their families. "Westward No!" is getting under way once more now that employers are recognising the value of foreign lebour. The greatest need is for single men and women, who can be accommodated more easily near their places of work. The Ministry of Labour have nearly exhausted the available supply of single women in Germany and Austria and are intending to send teams to Denmark and Italy to obtain recruits grom among the displaced persons in this countries. As regards male workers, priority is being given to Austria (especially to the Yugoslavs in that country). It is expected that 250 persons a week will be coming here from Austria soon.* The attached record of a visit to a holding camp in this country shows how the problem of placing EVWs in employment is being dealt with by the Ministry of Labour.

2.

5. The Netherlands Government is also about to take a number of displaced persons and Sweden has made a preliminary offer to take 2,000 Sudeten Germans from Austria. The Scandinavian countries do not appear to be anxious to take politically-disaident displaced persons. Norway has taken 600 Jews, but no others, while Denmark is desperately anxious to see the backs of the few thousand Balts and Ukrainians who have found refuge there and who, although mostly usefully employed there, are nevertheless a source of political embarrassment.

6. This fear of offending Soviet and Communiat susceptibilities is also one of the causes of the control of the French Government's reluctance to take political dissidents and their preference for German nationals and persons of German ethnic origin. However, they have apparently promised I.R.O.

*Better results in recruitment from Austria are expected now that the Maclean Mission is to lend a hand in selecting suitable workers.





that they will take 50,000 displaced persons and a similar figure has been proposed by them as the maximum number which they are prepared to take from our Zone of Germany. Nevertheless, the French authorities have been a little evasive andr the whole question, and we cannot rely on their taking any bons-fide displaced persons at all unless they realise that their manpower difficulties cannot be solved by any other means. Their attitude is very disturbing, as there is little doubt that France could absorb a large proportion of the displaced persons now in Europe.


3.

7. Overseas resettlement has been going very slowly. This is principally due to the slow and cumbersome methods of the various selection missions, especially the Argentine Mission. Shipping is no longer a serious problem, but the cost of oversess resettlement is so high that I.R.C. with its limited funds cannot afford to ship as many refugees as they would wish. This is all the more exasperating because it is in Latin America that large-scale group resettlement (the most effective means of getting rid of dispaced persons without special technical qualifications) would be most likely to succeed. Unfortunately this type of resettlement is the most expensive, since quite spart from the cost of transport, considerable capital expenditure would be required on land, buildings, tools and stock. Nevertheless, this expenditure would be recoverable as the settlements got under way, and the contribution to world recovery caused by the opening-up of new lands would be very considerable. There would appear to be possibilities for enterprising Governments or commercial undertakings to make a worth-while investment in such projects.

8. The Commonwealth countries have not been very. enterprising in seeking much-needed manpower from among the displaced persons in Europe. Australia has just agreed to

take/

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
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take 1,000 per month and Canada has for some time past been taking small groups of refugees for employment in special occupations such as lumbering, textile work and garmentmaking. New Zealand, though we have recently pressed her again in the matter, has not taken any displaced persons, and South Africa, despite the presence of two immigration missions in Europe, has likewise done nothing to dete.

9. The United States has provided the greatest disappointment in this respect. The Stratton Bill, which aimed at permitting the immigration of refugees at a rate of 100,00% a year for four years, has been shelved by Congress and it seems likely that some time will elapse before it is considered again. However, we have lost no opportunity of emphasising to visiting Congressmen and other interested parties that the shelving of the Bill makes nonsense of U.S. protestations about immigration into Palestine and is in sharp contrast with our own record of admitting refugees. There are indications that these representations have not been ineffective and it is possible that the Bill will not be buried, but willbe given an early hearing when Songress resesembles.

10. The early passage of the Bill would be the most effective means of solving the refugee problem, especially since there is little doubt that many Jewish refugees would be glad to go to America, whereas they are not attracted by, or are often debarred from, other resettlement schemes. This would deprive the Zionists of much **bf** their "raw material" for illegal immigration into Palestine and would make the task of I.R.O, much easier, since they could devote money at present devoted to care and maintenance towards resettlement instead.

11. As regards I.R.O., it should be understood that the Organisation is anxious to do more resettlement, but is seriously handicapped by the failure of other countries to/




to give it financial support and by the consequent limitations on its efficiency. Unless more money is forthcoming, I.R.C. will be hard pressed to find money for anything beyond care and maintenance which, although of necessity a first charge on its resources, does nothing to liquidate the refugee problem. We are trying to devise ways and means of reducing expenditure on care and maintenance in order to divert funds towards resettlement instead.

5.

12. Our policy is, of course, to sim at the early liquidation of the refugee problem, which is the source of so many other political and economic difficulties which are embarrossing to us. In order to bring this about, we are concentrating on the following points:-

- (1) Getting more countries to join I.R.O. and give it financial support.
- (11) Urging the strictest economy by I.R.O., especially in its administrative and care and maintenance budgets.
- (111) Pressing more European countries, and France in particular, to take refugee workers.
- (iv) Getting the United States Government and Congress to pass the Strattong Bill as soon as possible.
- (v) Encouraging other countries, especially those within the Commonwealth, to admit more refugees.
- (vi) Inspiring voluntary organisations to do more towards financing resettlement schemes.
- (vii) Interesting Governments, banks and other bodies in the value of group resettlement as a means of opening up undeveloped areas.

(A. W. H. Wilkinson) 8th October, 1947.



BRITISH ZONE, GERMANY, AS AT 15TH SEPTEMBER, 1947.

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Balts	64,736
Poles	98,881 (incl. 10,373 C.M.W.S end C.M.L.O.)
Polish-Ukrsinians	30,010
Russions	235
Yugoslevs	23,624 (incl. 6,204 C.M.W.S. and C.M.L.O.)
Undetermined and others	12,911
TOTAL IN ZON	E 250, 597

INTERD	STATES	AND	FRENCH	ZONES.	OERMANY.	AS .	AT_	JUNE.	1947

	U.S. Zone	French Zone
Belts	80,758	6,149
Poles	53,680	18,643
Polish-Ukrainians	69,774	••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Byelo-Russians	2,718	
Boviets	3,470	274
Yugoslavs	5,372	1,944
Undetermined and others	17,201	11,725
Jews	153,246	101

RUSSIAN ZONE - NO FIGURES AVAILABLE

BRI	TISH	ZONE.	AUSTRIA.	AS	AT	25711	AUGUST.	1947.
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Non-German D. Ps.	In Campa	<u>Outeide</u> Cempe
Hungeriens	1,891	5,363
Yugoslava	5,801	16,453
Poles	1,855	4,678
Balts	308	517
Polish-Ukrainians	1,483	1,118
Stateless, unclessified and others	4,592	12,050

TOTAL IN ZONE 15,930 in campa


40,164 outside camps.

Repetrieble Volksdeutsche <u>Comps</u> In Campa Sudeten Germans and Czechs 25,876 211 3,094 903 Hungariens 1,678 Poles 67

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1,181 TOTAL


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•	· .	In Camps	<u>Quteide</u> Cemps
Yugoelave		11,869	
Rumeniane		489	
Balts and	others	29	1.05
х.	TOTAL	12,522	205

Non-repetriable Volkadeutache

Reichedeutsche (D)

n Camps	
1,304	




30,642


INITED STATES ZONE. AUSTRIA. AS AT JULY. 1947

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	In Campa	<u>Outside</u> .
Nungeriens	97	5,241
Poles	869	2,575
Balte	1,238	972
Yugoslevs	1,487	3,682
Ukrainians	3,438	4,989
Others	11,360	115,291
TOTAL	18,489	32,750
Reichsdeutsche	In Campa	Cutaide Compa
	306	3,853
Volksdeutsche	In Camps	<u>Outside</u> Campe
Czechs	398	6,044
Hungeriens	675	1,035
Belts	117	23



Poles		603		3,855
Roumaniens		6,068		32,433
Yugoslava		12, 519		38,343
Others		31 2		642
			1	
•	TOTAL	20,472		82,375



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
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
FRENCH ZONE, AUSTRIA, AS AT JULY, 1947.

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· · · ·	In Cemps	<u>Ontaide</u> Camps
Belte	169	1,016
Polea	619	2,603
Hunger1ens	629	1,937
Polish-Ukreiniens	2,628	2,108
Yugoeleve	247	862
Others	2,048	2,455
TOTAL	6,340	10,981

Volksdeutsche	In Comps	<u>Outside</u> Campa
Yugoslevs	2,492	2,741
Rumani ens	422	1,448
Poles	32	791
Sudeten Germans	195	11,206
Hunger1ens	85	819
-		17.005





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RUBBIAN SONN, AUBTRIA, AB AT 18T MAY, 1947.

Displaced persons	7,109
Repatriable Volkadeutache	14,919
Non-repatriable Volkadeutache	4,469
Reichsdeutsche	5,021

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
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I.



BRIEF FOR UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION, NEW YORK,

ON THE REFUGEE PROBLEM.

ENTENT OF THE PROBLEM

The attached Annex 'A' gives the number of displaced persons in receipt of U.N.R.R.A. assistance on the 30th June, 1947, as 632,600. These people, together with several thousand additional displaced persons not formerly cared for by U.N.R.R.A., are now the responsibility of I.R.O. In addition, there are about 50,000 displaced persons in Germany, 80,000 in Austria and 150,000 in Italy living outside camps who are not cared for by I.R.O. Finally there are some 350,000 Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutache in Austria of whom the majority can largely be discounted for resettlement purposes (although they are much sought after by the French) and absorbed into the German or Austrian population. There is some danger, however, in the case of Austria, that an attempt to absorb too many of this category may land her in difficulties with her neighbours once she is independent, and great injustice may result to those concerned.

II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

(A) Repatriation


The attached Annex 'B' shows that over 90% of persons displaced at the end of hostilities have now returned home. Although there is still a steady trickle of repatriates, it is quite clear that this must now be regarded as a diminishing force in the solution to the refugee problem.

(B) Absorption into the local economy

This would appear desirable for persons of German ethnic origin and for non-Germans who do not object to staying where they are. However, it would only provide a very limited solution to the problem and would be quite impracticable in a country like Italy with two million unemployed, or in the Middle East.

(C) <u>Resettlement</u>

This is undoubtedly the only satisfactory alternative, and although there are considerable difficulties in the way, they are not insuperable. The example of the United Kingdom might be quoted here. Since the end of the war over 300,000 individuals, who would otherwise have been in d.p. camps on the Continent, have been admitted into this country. In the past six months 25,000 more have arrived here and more



are still erriving under 'Westward Ho!' Even 11, as seems possible, a total of 400,000 persons will eventually have found a home in this country, they will emount to less then 1% of the total population of the United Kingdom, although they would represent about 50% of the number remaining in Europe. If the United States were to absorb refugees at helf that proportion, there would be no refugees left. It seems peradoxical that it is the most densely-populated countries, such as Belgium and the United Kingdom, which are doing most in resettlement, while countries with emple resources for large-scale resettlement are timidly dellying with emall-scale projects or are not taking any d.ps. at all.

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Quite spart from the humanitarian aspect of relieving the misery of a million homeless people, it is obviously desirable that the fullest possible use should be made of this vast reservair of first-class labour. It would be a major contribution towards world recovery if what are mostly 'mouths' in Germany, Austris and Italy could be turned into 'hands' in Australis, Argentins or America.

The practical difficulties in the way of resettlement are:-

(1) Slow selection methods.


This can be overcome by cutting redtape and impressing selection missions with the need for speedy registration and embarkation of emigrants who are otherwise likely to be mopped up by more enterprising missions.

(11) Lack of funds for resettlement.

This applies principally to largescale group resettlement for which considerate capital expenditure is required in order to purchase land, stock, machinery and other supplies. Quite apart from the fact that Governments might find it very profitable to make loans for such a purpose, there is smple scope for voluntary organisations to provide funds for such a constructive purpose. The funds raised in the United States, which have certainly gone in part to finance Jewiah terroism and illegel immigration, could have been used instead to resettle some thousands of Jewish displaced persons, whereas they have not succeeded in getting a single Jew resettled anywhere.

(111) Shortage of shipping.

There are about 1,000 d.ps. registered as seamen and fishermen, who could provide crews. There are scores, if not hundreds, of suitable ships/





ships rotting in American harbours. If the two could be brought together, there would be no shipping shortage, and the traffic would not compete with established passenger lines.

(iv) Housing difficulties.

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These are not unknown in this country, yet we can bring in d.ps. by the thousand. There would appear to be even less difficulty in countries where timber and other materials are abundant. In any case the dps. themselves are capable of making even the most unlikely accommodation quite habitable.


(v) Doubts as to advisability of admitting d.ps.

This is a much more thorny problem. Quite spart from the normal incidence of xenophobis (which is fortunately not at present made worse by unemployment among the indigenous population of most countries) the admission of large numbers of Jewish or anti-Soviet refugees is lakely to arouse considerable opposition from Right or Left respectively. Furthermore, there is likely to be considerable resistance in many countries to the admission of large unassimilable blocs of aliens, especially Jews. However, there is no reason to suppose that these objections cannot be overcome by careful selection in order to avoid creating new Palestines in Paraguey or Peru and to ensure that settlers are capable of absorbtion into the social and economic life of the country. In this connexion, attention might be drawn to the fact that only 40 out of the 25,000 persons brought to this country have been returned, and by no means all of this insignificant fraction were unsuitable or undesirable, since some of them left here for family reasons.

III TACTICS TO BE PURSUED

Our sims in the discussions on this question may be summarized as follows:-

- (a) To get more support for I.R.O. so that it can become a really effective resettlement organisation and not a glorified soup-kitchen.
- (b) To get more countries to take in refugees. from SEARCHE
- (c) To **separate** the Jewish refugee problem from the Palestine question and to submerge it in the general refugee problem.
- (d) To make it more widely known how great has been our contribution to a lasting solution of the refugee problem in contrast to the very poor record of other countries, especially the United States.




The Soviet Government and their satellites are on the whole still opposed to any solution other then repatriation, regardless of the wishes of the persons concerned, but we cannot afford to let this problem drag on indefinitely just to avoid annoying them. If they launch their traditional attacks on our refugee policy, we should point out that they have only themselves to blame for failing to make repatriation an attractive proposition and by causing their Jewish nationals to flock westwards, thus deterring their non-Jewish nationals from returning home to countries where Jews apparently cannot feel secure. It should be pointed out that d.ps. have been free to return home at any time they pleased in the course of the last two and a half years and that, even after resettlement, there is nothing topfevent them from approaching their national diplomatic or consular representatives with a view to repatriation.

It is just possible that Slav opposition to resettlement may not be quite as violent as it was last year. The Anglo-Yugoslav Agreement represents a "breach of faith" on the part of the Yugoslavs, who have agreed to, and indeed almost prayed for, the removal of their nationals from our Zone of Austria and have said that they do not require the forcible repatriation of persons whose surrender they have not demanded by name.

The Moslem States may be more favourable to pur views if we can make them understand that I.R.G. and other resettlement schemes can help to divert the Jews from Palestine, that Jews refusing reasonable offers of resettlement can then be excluded from I.R.O. aid and that they will then have to rely on assistance from Jewish organisations, whose funds will thus be diverted from illegal traffic. A further point on which they may be vulnerable is that by supporting our proposals they will be helping the hundreds of Albanian, Yugoslav and Soviet Moslem refugees, who would suffer an unpleasant fate if the Soviet attitude were to be upheld.

It is suggested that any resolution adopted by the General Assembly or any of its Committees on the refugee problem should stress the following points:-

- (a) The continued presence of large numbers of refugees in Europe and the Middle East is undesirable on political and economic grounds.
- (b) As it is now obvious that the majority of these refugees are not likely to accept repatriation or to be assimilated into the local population, it is a matter of urgency that they should be resettled without delay, and that there should be no racial or religious discrimination in resettlement.
- (c) The General Assembly by its Resolution of the 12th February, 1946, having recognized that/



that the refuges problem is "international in scope and nature," it is incumbent upon members of play their part in bringing about an early solution to the problem.

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(d) To this end, members are urged to state what contribution they are prepared to make, by financial support for I.R.O. and/or by admitting refugees to their territopies.

Foreign Office,

2nd October, 1947.



Central Office of Information

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DIPLOMATIC PROGRAME para

ITEM ONE stop Economic Social Committee of United Nations Assembly bracket Committee number Three bracket has this week been discussing urgent and vital problem of resettlement of the one million two hundred thousand refugees and displaced persons still lying homeless inside or outside camps in Europe para

These refugees of course include Jewish refugees in Europe but Jews represent less than one quarter of total number stop Problem is therefore essentially general and not preeminently Jewish problem para

Imperative need to find homes for Jewish refugees in Europe is widely recognised and United Nations Special Committee on Palestine invits recommendation number six urged General Assembly to quote undertake immediately initiation and execution of international arrangement for dealing with problem of distressed European Jews comma of whom approximately quarter million are in assembly centres comma as matter of extreme urgency for alleviation of their plight and of Palestine problem unquote para

HM Govt are acutely aware of urgency of refugee problem both in its general and its special Jewish aspects para


They accordingly submitted yesterday to Committee number Three resolution recommending that each member of United Mations should adopt urgent measures for settling

fair share of displaced persons and refugees in its country and that it should join with other nations through International Refugee Organisation or its Preparatory Commission in development of overall plans to accomplish this end para

Resolution was introduced by UK Delegate Mr Eavies who said this seemed appropriate time to call upon all countries to face seriousness of this problem and realise great benefits to be gained by positive attempts to solve it stop This was great opportunity for all to contribute towards quote turning mouths into hands unquote and he hoped British resolution would help to bring problem home to conscience of world para

In course of speech before Committee Mr Davies observed United Nations Special Committee on Palestine had rightly called attention to problem of Jewish refugees in Europe stop Like all other Govts HM Govt were anxious do utmost to solve this Jewish P.T.O.

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aspect of problem stop But HM Govt comma he emphasised comma were equally concerned to end once for all sufferings of romaining seventyfive percent or hore of non Jewish refugees and displaced persons and turn them into useful members of society with settled occupations pera

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Mr Davies mentioned as some of most urgent practical needs semicolon more rapid procedure by missions selecting displaced persons for immigration comma more funds for resettlement comma more ships for transport but above all greater readiness by individual countries to admit displaced persons para

HM Govt felt the less enbarrassed in making this plea to other countries in view of record of what Britain herself had done in matter stop From end war to spring of this year three hundred thousand individuals who would otherwise have been in displaced persons camps on European continent had been admitted into UK of when/two hundred thousand had found homes here and remainder had been settled elsewhere stop In last few months another twentyfive thousand had arrived and still more were arriving under British quote Westward Ho unquote scheme for absorbing refugees and displaced persons into exployment in UK para

Mr Davies reminded Committee that there existed machinery ready to hand for dealing with this problem namely Préparatory Commission of International Refugee Organisation and question was what could this Assembly do to make this machinery effective and give one million people a home para

In substance comma LPS Diplomatic Correspondent observes comma British view is that refugee problem is general problem stop Problem of Jewish refugees is part of it but should not be considered separately from it stop Problem calls

for immediate action which should take form of effective resettlement comma which is economic as quote turning mouths into hands unquote comma rather than of care and maintenance which perpetuates instead of liquidating problem stop Urgent need is to secure more support for International Refugee Organisation and for more countries to take in refugees para

Lastly LPS Diplomatic Correspondent stresses that if prospect is fulfilled and that as many as three hundred thousand refugees/displaced persons shall have eventually found home in UK comma this country with its dense population will have given hospitality with chance of starting new life to nearly one quarter of all refugees displaced persons left in Europe as aftermath of Nazi aggression dash p.t.o. contribution which compares favourably to say the least with that of other countries para

-3-.

By ruling of Chairman Committee Number Three will consider British resolution mentioned above together with two other resolutions on same subject put forward by Russia and by Egypt Irak Lebanon jointly para


ITEM TWO stop Molotovs speech in Moscow yesterday occasion thirtieth anniversary of Russian Revolution elicited comment in London that it was to be regretted that Molotov should have indulged in se vehement enslaught on British USA policies on eve of meeting Council Fereign Ministers where it is so important and desirable to reach agreement if possible between Russia and Western Powers para

A propes of Council Foreign Ministers meeting LPS Diplomatic Correspondent points out that passage in todays Times leader bracket given in Transmission One bracket is incorrect when it says quote There is little doubt American and British have new completed farreaching proparations for alternative course of action should there be another deadlock unquote at coming meeting of Council Foreign Ministers para

It can be authoritatively stated there has been no attempt on part of British and USA Govts to devise a policy which could be applied in event of failure of Foreign Ministers to agree stop Two Govts have concentrated on preparing for possible agreement para

END DIPLOMATIC PROGRAMME LPS

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